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Approved For Release 2004/06/14 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000400090040-1

31 October 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Reconnaissance of North Vietnam

1. On 27 October, the Director called me with reference to Mr. Proctor's attached note to him regarding the problems with which the intelligence community would be faced if reconnaissance over North Vietnam were severely curtailed. I told the Director that I had already requested a note on this subject from [REDACTED] OER, which I had just received. [REDACTED] note covered the question very well in succinct form and highlighted the problems involved. I assured the Director that at the next feasible opportunity I would raise this matter with some senior member of the NSC Staff to be sure they were put on notice regarding it.

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2. When Dr. Kissinger called on Saturday morning (28 October) and asked me to come see him in his office, I availed myself of the occasion to take with me a copy of [REDACTED] note on reconnaissance. During the course of our rather long conversation on various Vietnam-related matters, I handed this note to Dr. Kissinger emphasizing the seriousness of the potential problem. He assured me he understood the problem and would read [REDACTED] note with great interest.

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3. The subject of reconnaissance again arose at the WSAG meeting on Monday, 30 October. It was discussed there in rather general terms with Dr. Kissinger acknowledging -- in response to a direct question -- that reconnaissance was not being flown over North Vietnam north of the 20th Parallel at this time nor would reconnaissance by "manned aircraft" be flown over North Vietnam once a cease-fire agreement had been signed. During the lull in the conversation that followed Dr. Kissinger's comment, I interjected to ask if this ban on manned flight included SR-71's. He was clearly displeased with having the

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question raised though he used as the pretext for his displeasure the fact that I had raised it in a WSAG Committee meeting when it was properly 40 Committee business. (This is decidedly a non-issue since the membership of the two groups is virtually identical.) Dr. Kissinger's answer can best be described as a grudging "yes," though it was apparent that from his present thinking SR-71 flights over North Vietnam will be subject to the same tight-top-level policy control as are SR-71 flights today over North Korea or Communist China.

4. The reconnaissance issue was also discussed at the first meeting of the WSAG intelligence working group (Group C) held in my office on Tuesday, 31 October. The nature of this discussion with other matters at that meeting will be covered by [] in his memorandum for the record on it.

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[]
George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

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Attachment
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Copy No. 1 - DCI-VAS/RAC for file
Copy No. 1A - Dr. Kissinger
Copy No. 2 - ADDI
Copy No. 3 - D/OCI
Copy No. 4 - C/OER/D/S
Copy No. 5 - GAC Chrono
Copy No. 6 - Kissinger Memos file
Copy No. 7 - D/IAS

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26 October 1972

MEMORANDUM

Aerial Reconnaissance, North Vietnam
(North of 20th Parallel)

With the cessation of bombing and the loss of tactical aerial reconnaissance north of the 20° the Intelligence Community will have to rely on three reconnaissance systems for photographic coverage: the SR-71, Drone, and Satellite Systems. The SR-71 and Drones will remain the primary source of photographic coverage as they were after the bombing halt in 1968. Both systems produced good coverage of priority areas, coverage which was adequate to monitor reconstruction activity but was of limited use in monitoring of logistic activity. It should be noted, however, that there was a tendency by the Air Force to fly the same SR-71 track repeatedly. To ensure adequate coverage the

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27 October 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : Reconnaissance of North Vietnam

Some descriptions of the potential agreement for peace in Indochina include a provision for termination of all reconnaissance flights in connection with stopping the bombing. Obviously, if the final agreement does include such a provision, it will severely limit the kinds of questions from the White House that we will be able to answer. Satellite photography will be the only source still available to us.

I realize that this may have been considered by those who are working on the agreement but I cannot be sure. Nor can I be sure that the limitations of satellite photography -- its infrequency and the delays involved in its return and processing -- were realized even if the general problem was addressed.

Unless you know that these factors were actually considered, I recommend that you raise them with those involved.

STAT


Ed Proctor

cc: George Carver ✓

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DATE: 1 Nov 1972

TO: Mr. George W. Allen
Director, IAS

FROM: George A. Carver, Jr.

SUBJECT: Reconnaissance Problems

REMARKS:

Per our conversation, attached are two memoranda. The first is my note for the record summing up the current situation. The second is [] note to me which I handed physically to Dr. Kissinger during our 28 October conversation. Together, these will give you the dimensions of the problem. As we discussed over the phone, I urgently need any help you can provide in the shape of a defensible and defended statement of precisely what levels of reconnaissance and photography of various types will be necessary plus the obverse of this statement -- namely, what we will be unable to do if our photographic capabilities are curtailed either with respect to geography, permissible platforms or permissible frequencies.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachments

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